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I feel deeply honored to have this opportunity to present this essay to Jus-
tice Ginsburg. I am among the many feminists who have found wisdom 
and inspiration in her scholarship, her advocacy, her judicial opinions, 
and her life. Her work has also inspired me as a scholar and teacher of 
comparative law and civil procedure. Her early engagement of Swedish 
civil procedure helps us see the value of thinking transnationally to un-
derstand the trajectory of American law.
  Justice Ginsburg took her oath of office as a U.S. Supreme Court Jus-
tice on August 0, 99, five days after the Family and Medical Leave 
Act (FMLA) went into effect. Thus, 0 marks not only the twentieth 
anniversary of Justice Ginsburg’s tenure on the high Court, but also the 
twentieth birthday of a law that aspired to help Americans “balance the 
demands of the workplace with the needs of families.” Both events were 
important triumphs for legal feminism in the United States, which Jus-
tice Ginsburg played such a tremendous role in shaping and inspiring. 
In Justice Ginsburg’s words, FMLA was supposed to “make it feasible for 
women to work while sustaining family life.” While social scientists, legal 
scholars, and working moms can attest that this endeavor remains a work 
in progress, Justice Ginsburg’s dissenting opinion in Coleman v. Court 
of Appeals of Maryland envisions constitutional sex equality as entail-
ing “a more egalitarian relationship at home and at work.”4 It implicitly 78
critiques the limits of law in vindicating this ambitious commitment.
  The Family and Medical Leave Act guarantees employees  weeks of 
job-protected leave to care for a newborn or ill family member, or to 
care for one’s own serious health condition.5 A decade ago, the Supreme 
Court held that the family-care provision of the FMLA was a valid exer-
cise of Congress’s power to enforce the Equal Protection Clause. In Ne-
vada Department of Human Resources v. Hibbs, the Court had upheld the 
family-care provisions because a statutory guarantee of such leave to men 
and women alike would undercut employers’ incentive to discriminate 
against women based on their perceived likelihood of taking maternity 
leaves.6 In Coleman, by contrast, five Justices concluded that the self-care 
provision was not a valid exercise of the Fourteenth Amendment Section 
Five power. The plurality declared that, “[w]ithout widespread evidence 
of sex discrimination or sex stereotyping in the administration of sick 
leave, it is apparent that the congressional purpose in enacting the self-
care provision is unrelated to these supposed wrongs.”7 For the plurality, 
the FMLA’s gender-neutral sick leave guarantee grows out of a “concern 
for the economic burdens on the employee and the employee’s family 
resulting from illness-related job loss,” which it explicitly distinguishes 
from sex discrimination.8
  Justice Ginsburg’s disagreement with her colleagues on this point stems 
from her recognition that the legal path towards a “more egalitarian rela-
tionship at home and at work” is immensely complicated and demand-
ing. Digging through the legislative history of the FMLA, she recounts 
numerous stories of women who lost their jobs when they got pregnant 
or took a few weeks’ maternity leave.9 These stories show us, without 
telling us, that women’s full participation in the workplace requires legiti-
mate, adequate, and sustainable institutional arrangements for pregnancy 
and maternity leaves. Yet, in 0, the State of Maryland was arguing in 
this case that a state’s refusal to provide pregnancy leave to its employees 
was not unconstitutional.0
  In confronting Maryland’s argument, Justice Ginsburg proposes revisit-
ing the almost-forty-year-old constitutional understanding that pregnancy 79
discrimination is not sex discrimination. Yet, if pregnancy discrimination 
were held to violate the Equal Protection Clause, would it follow that 
the state’s failure to provide pregnancy leave to its employees is unconsti-
tutional? Throughout the 980s, as Justice Ginsburg recounts, American 
feminists debated about whether and how the law should guarantee preg-
nancy and childbirth leaves. “Equal-treatment” feminists wanted ma-
ternity leave to be a form of gender-neutral disability leave, and viewed 
special maternity leaves as sex discrimination. But a 978 California law 
protected maternity leave specially. Although the Supreme Court did not 
invalidate the California law on equal protection grounds, Justice Gins-
burg reminds us that “equal-treatment” feminism became the conceptual 
frame of the federal FMLA.
  Alternatively, many European countries provide female employees with 
extremely generous paid maternity leaves that last longer than the meager 
 unpaid weeks guaranteed by the FMLA. These special protections 
undoubtedly help working mothers reconcile the demands of work and 
family. But they don’t disrupt the gendered patterns of working and car-
ing that reinforce the inegalitarian relationship at home and at work.4	
American feminists had a more ambitious vision for FMLA: It guaran-
teed medical leave in a gender-neutral fashion not only to treat men with 
illnesses fairly, but to disrupt the rational dynamics of discrimination 
against women. Entitling men to job-protected leave for illness would 
lead employers to incur costs by employing men, roughly equal to the 
costs of employing women who might become pregnant and give birth. 
According to the equal-treatment theory, if women need pregnancy leave 
in order to be full participants in the workplace, giving men a similar 
benefit for illness could equalize the costs of hiring men and women and 
would thus render it economically irrational for employers to prefer men.
  As Justice Ginsburg points out, Congress agreed with this theory in en-
acting the self-care provision of the FMLA.5 Enacting a family-care leave 
without a self-care leave would be less effective in combating discrimina-
tion against women, due to the sex-role stereotype that family caregiv-
ing is women’s work.6 Rightly or wrongly, employers widely assume that 80
women are the primary consumers of “parental” leave, regardless of its 
availability to both genders. By contrast, since all human beings face a 
wide range of serious health conditions at one time or another, pregnant 
women are not presumed to be the primary consumers of medical leave. 
Thus, while the FMLA’s family leave mandate could increase the incen-
tive to discriminate against women, the self-care medical leave mandate 
was necessary to undercut that incentive.
  What emerges is a highly pragmatic, yet complicated and pluralis-
tic portrait of what constitutes sex discrimination and how it should be 
eliminated. Workplace discrimination includes, but should not be limited 
to, employers’ irrational preference for men over women based on false 
predictions about women’s likely behaviors after they give birth. Allowing 
women to sue for such straightforward discrimination is not a solution, 
largely because it is difficult to prove discrimination.7 According to Justice 
Ginsburg’s account, workplace discrimination against women also includes 
actions that well-meaning and rational employers adopt to avoid the real 
costs of pregnancy and child rearing. Congress can thus combat discrimi-
nation by making it as expensive to employ men as it is to employ wom-
en. Justice Ginsburg writes: “Essential to its design, Congress assiduously 
avoided a legislative package that, overall, was or would be seen as geared 
to women only. Congress thereby reduced employers’ incentives to prefer 
men over women, advanced women’s economic opportunities, and laid the 
foundation for a more egalitarian relationship at home and at work.”8 As 
reflected in these words, the project of gender justice will not succeed if 
it is geared to women only; it is a comprehensive reordering of men’s and 
women’s roles. Citing a Senate Report, Justice Ginsburg points out that the 
FMLA “addresses the dramatic changes that have occurred in the American 
workforce in recent years. . . . The once-typical American family, where the 
father worked for pay and the mother stayed home with the children, is 
vanishing.”9 The “more egalitarian relationship at home and at work” will 
involve changing men’s roles so that both mothers and fathers work for pay 
and care for the children equally. Congress laid a foundation, which the 
Court should not undo, and the rest of the work is up to the people.8
  What is most striking about Justice Ginsburg’s Coleman dissent is that 
she uses her own words sparingly. The egalitarian vision that emerges 
in this opinion is not written solely in her voice. It is largely a collec-
tive chorus of stories and debates from the testimony of women workers 
and advocates before Congress, Congress’s findings, and legislative text. 
It illustrates the nature of her ongoing commitment to a comprehensive 
gender equality, which will arrive not only through the enforcement of 
rights by courts, but through a democratic constitutionalism that can be 
supported, reframed, and encouraged by a wise judicial voice.0
m
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